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Abstract 
 
South Africa is among the most crime-ridden and crime-concerned countries in the world (UN-
ODC 2002).  Situated in the Western Cape, Cape Town has one of the highest rates of violent, 
property and commercial crime in the country. The apartheid government left both physical and 
social legacies unique to South Africa that complicate questions of crime patterns and make 
current literature on crime inadequate to explain Cape Town. This thesis uses an economic 
model of crime where individuals weigh the expected costs of committing a crime against the 
expected benefits to explore whether proximity to a high-violent-crime neighborhood increases 
property crime in middle and upper class suburbs. Using linear regression techniques, this thesis 
finds that contrary to popular belief, suburbs furthest away from violent neighborhoods 
experience higher property crime rates even after holding income and other neighborhood 
variables constant.  
  
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements I would like express my gratitude for the many people who shared their 
thoughts and ideas with me throughout this project. Thank you to my fellow honors members for 
providing support and humor from the very beginning. To my committee members, Professor 
Raymond Robertson of the Macalester Economics department and Professor David Lanegran of 
the Macalester Geography department for their invaluable suggestions, critiques, and ideas. 
Finally, a special thank you to my project advisor and role model Professor Sarah West. 
Professor West shared not only her economic brilliance but also her energy and dedication to 
seeing this project through its completion. Thank you.  
 
 
 
 
  
3 
Introduction  
South Africa is considered among the most crime-ridden and crime-concerned countries 
in the world (UN-ODC 2002).  Situated in the Western Cape, Cape Town has some of the 
highest rates of violent, property and commercial crime in the country. Despite growing 
expenditures for safety and justice, reaching R617 million (US$92 million) per year, the 
expectations that high crime rates would subside following the first democratic elections of 1994 
have failed to materialize (UN-DOC 2002; Haskins 2007).  South Africa has gone from GDP 
growth rates of -0.6 percent shortly following the end of the apartheid to positive rates of 2.2 
percent by 2001 (UN-DOC 2002).  Despite this growth, per capita income remains low 
(US$2,900) and the country is characterized by unusually high and growing income inequality 
with Gini coefficient estimates ranging from 0.56 to 0.73 (Hoogeveen and Özler 2006; 
Leibbrandt, Poswell, et al. 2006).  Extreme inequality is arguably linked to crime (Ehrlich 1973; 
Chiu and Madden 1998; Bourguignon 2001) because such disparities situate the underprivileged 
in close proximity to the wealth of the upper classes.  
The apartheid government left both physical and social legacies unique to South Africa. 
Like other urban areas across the country, Cape Town’s landscape today includes a rigid system 
of underdeveloped black townships and poor colored neighborhoods that are remnant of the 
Group Areas Act of 1950.1 Most western literature reports on patterns of concentrated crime 
rates in city centers and poor areas (Shaw and Mckay 1942; Boggs 1965; Andresen 2006) but 
                                                 
1
 The term “colored” is used to refer to an ethnic group of people who possess some degree of sub-Saharan ancestry 
but were classified as distinct from black populations by the apartheid government because of their European, 
Indonesian, or Indian ancestry. Despite having negative connotations in the United States, the term “colored” does 
not carry the same history in South Africa and is still commonly used today alongside “white” and “black” to 
describe the other two prominent races.  
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less attention is given to the interaction of poor neighborhoods with their wealthy neighbors. For 
this reason, the current crime literature cannot fully explain the crime patterns in Cape Town. 
The uniqueness of Cape Town calls for an in-depth analysis of crime to fill the gaps left by 
western scholars.   
 Property crime concerns both entrepreneurs and residents. Cape Town businesses cited 
crime as the biggest challenge facing the city while residents rated it second, especially in the 
non-township suburbs (Benjamin, 2007). Likewise, potential investors cite crime as the biggest 
deterrent to investment in South Africa (EIU 1999-2000)2 and firm surveys indicate that 
employers consider crime as the most important constraint to growth (Bhorat and Kanbur 2006).   
While statistics show that whites are more likely to be victims of property crime (UN-OCD 
2002), expression of their fear of crime is criticized as having racial undertones.  In a Political 
Report to the National Conference of the ANC, President Nelson Mandela compared the “white 
fear” of crime to the political strategy used by whites around the time of transition,  
“The prophets of doom have re-emerged in our country. In 1994, these predicted 
that the transition to democracy would be attended by a lot of bloodshed... (Now) 
their task is to spread messages about an impending economic collapse, escalating 
corruption in the public service, rampant and uncontrollable crime…” (Political 
Report of the President, 1997).  
The racial currents that run through these debates are clear legacies of the era where race was the 
defining characteristic of one’s identity.  This paper does not set out to test the fears that crime 
rates with increase across the city with the end of the apartheid. Instead, this paper acknowledges 
the new mobility of black and coloreds, and simply looks at where those crimes are being 
committed. By introducing another approach to analyze crime patterns in Cape Town, the current 
                                                 
2
 As cited in UN-DOC 2002.  
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study will help determine whether the debated “white fear” of those closest to black and colored 
neighborhoods is based in truth.  In other words, by asking the question, “Does proximity to high 
violent crime neighborhood have a greater effect on property crime rates than income in middle 
and upper class neighborhoods in Cape Town?,” I hope to uncover the significance of location to 
determine who is really at risk.  
A spatial analysis of crime in Cape Town has the potential to benefit policy makers in 
their pursuit of more effective policies and efficient resource allocation that come from better 
anticipation of crime targets. Beyond Cape Town policy makers, the results will also be helpful 
for city planners everywhere by shedding light on consequences of segregation and the dangers 
of extreme inequality. 
This paper is divided into six sections. Section I describes Cape Town’s physical 
landscape and provides other background information that will better familiarize the reader with 
the present situation. Section II summarizes the current literature on both the economic and 
spatial explanations for crime while section III introduces the theoretical framework that 
supports my question and shapes the model for estimation. Section IV details the data and 
variable definitions. This section also presents summary statistics and preliminary analysis based 
on what those numbers suggest. Section V presents the regression results and interpretation of 
the coefficients. Finally, Section VI concludes by summarizing my findings and suggesting 
directions for further research.  
I. Cape Town Description 
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Cape Town sits at the top of a peninsula that extends 50 kilometers south from the city 
center and ends with the Cape of Good Hope, the symbolic eastward turn for Portuguese 
colonialists. Table Mountain, the prominent landmark that sits in the middle of the Cape Town 
metropolitan area, begins a small mountainous terrain that winds down the middle of the 
peninsula. Nestled in between the mountains and the shoreline is beach property with large 
homes that are owned by both locals as well as foreigners who use them as vacations homes. 
Figure 1 shows an example of these properties along the coast. The Cape Town metro area 
consists of the Cape Town City Center as well as individual residential suburbs that spread in all 
directions from the city center.  
The city center looks and operates much like downtown areas in the United States: it has 
tall skyscrapers that host offices and corporate headquarters; government buildings, hotels and 
hostels; handicraft shops and open air markets; as well as prominent night life destinations. 
Figure 2 is a photograph shot from the edge of the downtown area with Table Mountain in the 
background. In addition to the bustle created by the commercial activity, the city center also 
serves as a public transportation hub because of its position between the beach suburbs and the 
rest of Cape Town.  Finally, the waterfront area borders the downtown area and attracts many 
tourists because of its shops, seaside restaurants, and the loading dock for ferry trips out the 
Robben Island, the infamous prison where Nelson Mandela served the majority of his 27 year 
prison term.   
The suburbs that radiate away from the city center each have a distinct history and 
character. The suburbs immediately outside the city center are densely populated wealthy 
suburbs that have, as a consequence of its proximity to the beaches, a significant amount of 
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rental property for young professionals as well as developed lots for established locals. Located 
just east of the downtown area is the historic District Six, which was a former black and colored 
community that was forcibly removed and transplanted to townships on the outskirts of town at 
the height of the apartheid government. Today, District Six blends in as part of the wealthier 
Cape Town landscape. Further from the city center the suburbs are middle and working class 
neighborhoods. During apartheid, these would have been primarily white neighborhoods because 
of their proximity to the city center and nice views of the mountain. Today, they remain mostly 
white neighborhoods but are home to a growing number of middle class blacks and coloreds. 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show an example of homes in a middle class neighborhood, Mowbray, 
which is approximately 6 kilometers from the city center. The pattern of very few street level 
windows and barred doors should be noted as one possible example of how high rates of 
property crime influence local architecture.  
More inland and away from the mountain, the landscape is dominated by black and 
colored townships. The townships themselves were created as another means for racial 
segregation and oppression; their design and layout therefore reflect that objective. Hoping to 
contain the sprawl and growth of these neighborhoods, government officials used physical 
boundaries such as highways and train tracks to define the official township spaces.  As a result 
of this design, and increased urban migration since the end of the apartheid, informal 
settlements- entire neighborhoods of shacks- are squeezed right up against the freeways that run 
into Cape Town, as can be seen in Figure 5 and Figure 6. Given the hierarchy of racial status 
during the apartheid, the black townships were maintained at a much lower living standard than 
the colored neighborhoods, which do not typically have informal housing systems. While many 
improvements have been made since the end of the apartheid, these neighborhoods are still 
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characterized by poor living standards, poverty, unemployment rates as high as 50 percent, high 
rates of disease and illiteracy, and infamously high rates of violent crime.  
Given this layout of the city, public transportation plays a critical role in bringing the low 
skilled workers from the townships to the wealthier suburbs where they work. For that reason, 
the Cape Town transportation network includes above-ground rail trains that service routes 
leading into downtown and the residential suburbs, as well as some of the beachfront areas. The 
taxis, or minibuses, operate in addition to the trains and are often the preferable means of 
transportation because of their flexible routes. Less commonly used are cabs that function much 
like taxis and cabs do in the US: a driver transports an individual or a group to a specific 
destination and charges by the distance traveled. Cabs in Cape Town are relatively more 
expensive so very few locals use this mode of transportation.  
II. Literature Review 
Although many factors affect crime, it is inherently an economic phenomenon. Economic 
models of crime have their origin in Gary Becker (1968). In this seminal work, Becker proposes 
an occupational choice model that considers the differential gains from legal and illegal pursuits. 
Hellman and Apler (1993) restate this model to suggest that the number of offenses is a function 
of the potential gains from the crime weighed against the probability of being arrested times the 
cost of being convicted. In addition to the costs of being arrested, these models imply that 
criminals also consider the direct costs of travel to high income areas and weigh them against 
their potential gains. In Cape Town, travel costs can include a walk across a busy street into a 
neighboring middle class neighborhood or a train or taxi ride across the city.  
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The literature on spatial patterns of crime started with Guerry (1831)3 who used crime 
statistics for different areas of France to show that property crime was concentrated in high 
income areas while violent crime was more common in low income areas. These findings 
support Becker’s economic model: the gains from property crime are greater where high income 
households can afford more valuable property. Shaw and Mackay (1942) build off of this finding 
and study criminal offense patterns in Chicago over time. They find a similar distribution of 
property and violent crime as Guerry and add that these rates persisted amid population changes.  
They conclude that three urban conditions contribute to crime: heterogeneity (economic and 
social), mobility, and poverty. Another early study by Boggs (1966) divided crime into narrower 
categories and looked at patterns across those categories. The results suggested a pattern wherein 
rates of business robbery, non-residential burglary, auto-theft, and grand larceny are higher in 
high social rank areas adjacent to low social rank areas where the offenders live. In terms of 
Cape Town, there is very little debate that offenders of property crime reside in townships 
(Demombynes and Özler 2006; Weir-Smith 2004) and seek targets outside their neighborhood 
where the returns are potentially greater.  
Evolving from the empirical studies described above, the routine activity theory explains 
crime patterns as being linked to routine activity spheres of individual victims and offenders 
(Cohen and Felson, 1979). The theory predicts that victimization is explained by daily routines 
of an individual, which in turn is influenced by demographic variables. Given that different 
socio-demographic and socio-economic conditions exist in different places at the same time and 
therefore exhibit different routine activities, criminal victimization is said to be neither random 
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 As cited in Johnson, et al. 2007.  
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nor uniform across neighborhoods (Mustaine and Tewksbury 1998). Weir-Smith (2004) uses 
interviews with substance abusers and offense statistics to test routine activity theory in South 
Africa. The findings challenge the theory and contend that substance abuse criminals operate 
beyond their routine activity sphere- implying significant travel distances. Weir-Smith concludes 
that South Africa does not fit into theories created to explain crime patterns in the developed 
world because criminals are more mobile and less community-bound than the theory predicts. 
While the present study does not explicitly test routine activity, we might expect the predictions 
of Wier-Smith to explain the spatial patterns of property crime in Cape Town and how they are 
different from common patterns in the developed world.  
While many empirical studies consider spatial crime patterns with relation to nearby 
impoverished neighborhoods in developed countries (Andresen, 2006; Ceccato, Haining and 
Signoretta, 2002; Martin, 2002; Wang and Minor, 2002), few analyze the situation in low- and 
middle-income countries. Portnov and Rattner (2003) study crime patterns in Israel using an 
index of relative income among neighboring localities as an explanatory variable. They find that 
affluent neighborhoods surrounded by poor neighborhoods tend to exhibit higher rates of 
property crime than poor neighborhoods surrounded by wealthier localities. They predict that 
wealthy areas may become magnets for the ‘crime-prone’ residents of nearby low-income 
neighborhoods. They also find that as the distance between neighborhoods increased, the 
interaction between residents declines. This conclusion supports ‘distance-decay’ theory that as 
the distance between towns grows the interaction of the respective residents declines.  Given that 
the present study also explores spatial crime patterns in a developing country, we might expect to 
see similar results in Cape Town.   
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What remains is a gap in the literature that unites these branches of research and looks at 
spatial patterns of crime in Cape Town. Weir-Smith’s (2004) study of drug trafficking and 
leisure patterns claims to be the first to use South Africa crime statistics and GIS analysis to 
better understand criminal behavior in broader South Africa. This paper takes an even more local 
approach to see the ways in which Cape Town crime patterns are different and similar to what 
the literature predicts.  
 
III. Theory 
Rational criminals will commit a crime if the benefits exceed the cost of the crime 
(Becker 1968; O’Sullivan 2007; Hellman and Alper 1993). Given the uncertain nature of crime, 
the calculation of costs and benefits is based on expected values and therefore must consider the 
likelihood of different outcomes. For criminals considering property crime, the benefit is 
measured by the value of the property obtained. The costs, on the other hand, are more complex. 
A criminal will consider the physical costs required (a gun or knife, clothing disguises, and travel 
costs), the cost of being arrested (fines, prison times, and probation costs), and the probability of 
being arrested (Hellman and Alper 1993). These costs and benefits differ for each crime so each 
crime decision is made on the margin, with the criminal weighing the additional benefits against 
the additional costs.  
A simple measure of the marginal benefit (MB) of a crime is the potential resale value of 
the property. Such resale value will, in equilibrium, equal the value of the total potential utility 
that could be derived from the property if kept by the thief. I assume that the criminal is unable 
to systematically target high-profit targets first so the benefit of any potential crime is its 
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expected value, which does not vary across targets. For this reason, the criminal faces a flat 
marginal benefit curve as a function of number of offenses.   
Because there are more people interested in his arrest and an increased likelihood that 
they can describe him, the marginal cost (MC) of a crime will increase as a criminal commits 
more offenses. For that reason, the criminal faces an upward sloping MC curve. Figure 7 shows 
a simple equilibrium that combines the two effects just described. The criminal maximizes the 
net benefits of crime by choosing the number of offenses so that the marginal benefit of 
committing the last crime equals its marginal cost (at the intersection of the MB and MC). A 
smaller number of offenses results in forgone positive net benefits, while any crime committed 
beyond the optimal number has expected costs that exceed the expected resale value.   
The expected costs and benefits of a crime vary spatially across the city of Cape Town. 
Figure 8.1 compares the marginal benefit of crime in a low-income neighborhood versus a high-
income neighborhood. Since property held by individuals or households in high-income areas is 
likely to be of a greater expected value, the marginal benefit of committing a crime in that 
neighborhood is greater than that in the low-income neighborhood. Figure 8.1 depicts this, 
holding marginal costs constant: the marginal benefit curve for the high income neighborhood 
intersects the marginal cost curve farther to the right and results in a higher number of offenses 
in that neighborhood. In other words, if a criminal is going to steal outside his community I 
expect him to opt for wealthy neighborhoods because the net benefit is greater.  
Holding marginal benefit constant, an offense in a distant neighborhood will require 
greater travel costs than a neighborhood adjacent to the criminal’s neighborhood. Consistent with 
taxi and train fares and walking time in Cape Town, I assume that travel costs increase linearly 
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with distance traveled. As Figure 8.2 illustrates, this greater marginal cost (represented by the 
leftmost MC curve) results in an equilibrium with fewer offenses. In Cape Town, we expect to 
see more offenses occurring in neighborhoods close to where the criminals live.  
Given that these two effects are in place, I hope to determine the relative magnitudes of 
these effects. Is it the increased marginal benefit from a high income area or the decreased 
marginal cost from an adjacent neighborhood that provides greater motivation for a crime?  
In addition to the marginal cost and benefit, the criminal’s decision to commit a crime 
depends on other characteristics of each neighborhood. Proponents of social disorganization 
theory argue that a high degree of social and economic deprivation and population turnover in a 
neighborhood contribute to social disorganization and creates an environment conducive to 
crime (Andresen 2006). I control for this effect by including unemployment rates, population 
density, ethnic composition, education levels, and home ownership for each neighborhood in the 
model. I expect a positive relationship between crime and social disorganization variables.  
Given the nature of the city center as a transportation hub and an area of high economic 
activity that attracts people from all over Cape Town, proximity to it might increase crime rates 
in nearby suburbs. Adding an additional variable that measures the distance from each suburb to 
the city center will allow the possibility that criminals make their decision with the city center as 
their starting point because of its centrality and easy access point to other suburbs. For this 
reason, I expect a negative relationship between distance to the city center and property crime 
rates.   
  
14 
Finally, physical neighborhood characteristics also matter (Anselin, 2000; Boggs, 1965). 
A measurement of land use (commercial and residential) in each neighborhood will approximate 
the amount of economic and residential activity, the number of pedestrians and the number of 
parked cars. I expect to see more crime in residential and commercial areas. 
Simply written, the model to be estimated is: 
Property Crime Rate = α + β1Marginal Benefit + β2 Marginal Cost + β3 Social Disorganization 
   Variables + β4 Land Use + e             
Where α is a constant and the β are slope terms to be estimated and e is an error term which is 
normally distributed around a mean of zero.  
IV. Data and Summary Statistics  
Given the complexity of crime, there are many ways to approach this question. Ideally, 
measures of train and taxi travel times, fares, and routes and the resale value of the property 
stolen would appear in the data set. Such measurements would more accurately describe the 
decision that criminals face. Additionally, the probability of arrest in the subject suburbs would 
control for the varying riskiness of those neighborhoods. Unfortunately, the available data falls 
short of this ideal and therefore alternative measurements and variables are used.   
  
15 
The original sample includes 161 suburbs but is reduced to 137 because of missing data, 
industrial areas or ambiguous aggregating in the ArcGIS shape files of areas on the outskirts of 
the metropolitan area4.  
In order to perform the analysis, the remaining sample needs to be divided into two 
groups: one group of subject suburbs whose proximity to the second group is tested for 
explanatory power on the crime rates. The task of categorizing the sample into two groups could 
be done in several ways. Ideally, we would have data on the exact location of residence for all 
Cape Town criminals who commit a crime outside their neighborhood and would use those 
neighborhoods that produce the most criminals as our second category. In the absence of that 
data, other means must be considered. Following from the social disorganization literature, 
variables that reflect a breakdown in the local cohesiveness of a neighborhood would be a 
reasonable measure for categorization. As pioneers of delinquency theory, Shaw and McKay 
(1942) found that the slum areas of Chicago were the breeding grounds for delinquency due to 
weak social control. As a result of that weak social control, both violent and property crime 
emerge as a new system of rule with criminal traditions being passed onto fellow members of the 
community, known as cultural transmission. Following from this, I make the assumption that 
neighborhoods that report high violent crime rates subscribe to a criminal culture that would 
                                                 
4
 The following suburbs are omitted from the sample because of missing data: Acacia Park, Cape of Good Hope, 
Somerset West Non-Urban, Table Mountain, Ysterplaat, Fistankraal. The following are industrial areas and 
therefore have no residential data: Epping, Erinvale Montague Gardens. These suburbs were reported in the census 
but were aggregated with other suburbs in the GIS shapefile, most of these suburbs fall on the outskirts of the 
metropolitan area: Atlantis Non-Urban, Belleville Non-Urban, Capri Village, Coniston Park, Dreyersdal, 
Doornbach, , Fairways, Firgrove, Frogmore Estate,  Imizamo Yethu, Marina Da Gama, Milnerton Non-Urban, 
Phillipi Non-Urban, Red Hill, Schaap Kraal, Sheraton Park, Silvertown, Steenberg, Vissershok, Youngsfield. 
Robben Island is excluded because it is an island. The total population of these omitted suburbs is 60,810 with an 
average size of 2,027. The overall population for Cape Town, as reported in the census, is 2,856,659.  
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necessitate and celebrate property crime. For this reason, I categorize the suburbs based on those 
in the top 25th percentile of violent crime rate as the criminal base group while the rest are the 
subject suburbs of interest.5 Under this categorization, there are 101 subject suburbs and 36 
violent crime neighborhoods. Figure 9 maps the distribution of the subject suburbs (in yellow), 
the violent crime neighborhoods (in pink) and the omitted suburbs (in beige). 
 The omission of certain suburbs could bias my estimates. Given that many of the omitted 
suburbs are on the outskirts of town, it is possible that the coefficient on distance will be biased 
depending on the crime patterns in these suburbs. If crime rates are high in these areas, for 
example, the model would underestimate the coefficient on distance because the distance 
variable for those suburbs would be large. Without those suburbs included, the model would 
under predict crimes in suburbs with larger distance variables. Figure 9 shows a large area north 
of the city which initially might cause of concern, but this is mostly non-urban, agricultural land 
that has little residential area.  
The data for this analysis come from two main sources. First, the crime data are collected 
by the South African Police Service (SAPS) and are aggregated by the police district within 
which the crime occurred. I aggregate eight categories of 2001 property crime data and exclude 
crimes without a clear property gain.6 The data are in raw numbers for each police district.  To 
                                                 
5
 Violent crime was defined as murder, rape, attempted murder, assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily 
harm, common assault, indecent assault, kidnapping, abduction, neglect and ill-treatment of children, culpable 
homicide, public violence, and arson.  
6
 The following categories were defined as property crime and aggregated together for each suburb: Robbery with 
aggravating circumstances, common robbery, carjacking, burglary at residential premises, burglary at business 
premises, theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle, theft out of or from motor vehicle, all theft not mentioned 
elsewhere. Those that are not considered property crime with a gain, and therefore left out of the crime statistic 
include: murder, rape, attempted murder, assault with the intent to inflict grievous harm, common assault, indecent 
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achieve a crime rate per suburb, I distribute them to the suburbs within each district according to 
their relative population. Those police districts that are perfectly aligned with a suburb’s 
boundaries are left alone. In cases where a suburb is divided between two or three police 
districts, I weight the crime statistics by population by relative area of that police district. 
Suburbs are assigned to police districts using shapefiles provided by the City of Cape Town’s 
Corporate GIS for suburbs and police districts as organized in 2001.7 The first two rows of Table 
1 and Table 2 show the distribution of property crime in the total sample and subject suburbs, 
respectively. 
Second, the socio-economic data are taken from the Cape Town 2001 census that was 
collected by Statistics South Africa but is made available through the City of Cape Town. Table 
1 gives the summary statistics for each variable for the entire city of Cape Town, and Table 2 
and Table 3 summarize the data for the subject suburbs and violent crime neighborhoods, 
respectively. A comparison of the statistics suggests that the subject suburbs experience a 
slightly higher rate of property crime (152 per thousand people) than the entire sample (119 per 
thousand people). More whites concentrate in the subject suburbs (56.97 percent), compared to 
full sample (41.96 percent). Likewise, the income distribution shows an increase in the 
percentage of households in the top income bracket (from 8.74 to 11.32 percent) and a reduction 
                                                                                                                                                             
assault, kidnapping, abduction, neglect and ill-treatment of children, culpable homicide, public violence, truck 
hijacking, bank robbery, robbery of cash in transit, arson, malicious damage to property, crimen injuria, illegal 
possession of firearms and ammunition, drug related crime, and driving under the influence. Truck hijacking was 
excluded because trucks are used for transporting and the theft of one in a certain neighborhood does not reflect on 
the suburb itself.Commericial crime and shoplifting were left out because of missing data for a significant number of 
suburbs in the data set. Stock theft was not included because there were no reported cases in the subject suburbs.  
7
 The original shapefile contained 538 polygon shapes so the smaller localities were assigned to a suburb as listed in 
the census and their boundaries were dissolved to arrive at the map of suburbs used in this analysis.  
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of those in the lowest income bracket (from 25.92 to 19.55 percent) when the subject suburbs are 
isolated. These differences are even more dramatic when compared to the violent crime 
neighborhoods where the average percentage of lowest income households reaches 43.77, while 
an average of only 1.51 percent of households are in the highest income bracket.  
Figure 10 and Figure 11 aggregates this data to illustrate the relationship between 
property crime and income. Figure 11 focuses on the band of middle income suburbs that are 
closest to the violent crime neighborhoods where theory would predict the most crimes to occur. 
The figure should also be looked at with respect to income and crime. Theory would predict 
higher crime rates in areas of greatest income. The absence of a strong pattern between crime 
and income or location calls the theoretical predictions into question and further motivates an 
empirical analysis of the spatial distribution of crime.  
The distance variable is measured by determining the distance from the center point of 
each subject suburb to the center point of its closest violent crime neighbor.  ArcGIS generates a 
centroid for each suburb and employs Hawth’s Point-to-Point distance tool to create a matrix of 
distances between those points. This method has the potential to misrepresent exact distances 
because the size of the suburb affects the distance measurement. In other words, two small 
suburbs next to each other will report a much smaller distance variable than two large suburbs 
also right next to each other. While this issue could be problematic, it is less of a concern in this 
study  because the variation in distances is large enough and there is not a significant number of 
either extremely small or extremely large suburbs.  The distance to the city center is determined 
using the same method. Table 4 summarizes both distance variables for the subject suburbs and 
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shows that on average, subject suburbs are within 6.53 kilometers of a violent crime 
neighborhood but are much further from the city center (average of 15.57 kilometers). 
The income variable is the percentage of households with an income above R307, 201 
($41,457, 2008 USD) in the subject suburbs. Income percentages were found by combining the 
top two (the fourth and the fifth) income brackets reported by the census, with R307,201 being 
the bottom of the fourth bracket.  
A preliminary analysis comparing 25th and 75th percentile values suggests an interesting 
relationship. For both distance and income, Table 5 reports the values for the given percentile as 
well as an average with one value on either side of the observation to avoid the influence of an 
outlier. Without controlling for other important variables, this analysis suggests that suburbs that 
are closer to violent crime neighborhoods experience greater crime rates than those that are 
further away. For income, however, the table suggests a relationship that contradicts theory: 
suburbs with a fewer households in the top income brackets host greater property crime rates.  
The gap between the ideal and available data creates room for error. Firstly, by nature, 
crime statistics are never entirely accurate. A benefit of analyzing property crime is that victims 
are more likely to report these crimes for insurance purposes. Additionally, the hope that the 
stolen property will be recovered might motivate reporting. If underreporting occurs in a 
systematic way, a selection bias might arise. For example, if street muggings that result in the 
theft of a cell phone are considered insignificant by the majority of victims, the model will be 
unable to predict to occurrence of these important crime events. Therefore, if street muggings are 
typically done by younger criminals who target nearby suburbs, the model would under predict 
property crime in neighborhoods close by and would therefore bias the coefficient on distance 
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downward. Additionally, conclusions drawn from the results might not reflect the true spatial 
patterns of crime if one significant category of crime, like street muggings, is underreported.  
 Local analysts (Spinks 2001) suggest that crime rate statistics in Cape Town have been 
politicized which raises even more doubt about their accuracy. Such doubt, however, is not 
reason to abandon analysis of crime in Cape Town. Rather I apply MacDonald’s (2002) 
assumption that the reported data are simply a proportion of actual crimes committed and still 
useful for determining trends.8  
Second, while the process used to assign crime statistics is systematic, it creates a large 
potential for inaccuracy. This process assumes some proportionality between crime occurrence 
and population but fails to consider other suburb level factors that might influence the location of 
crime. For this reason, the model may overestimate the frequency of crime in some areas with 
greater populations and underestimate crime in areas with smaller populations. Population, 
however, does not seem to be correlated with income (-0.14, p value of 0.1523) or the distance 
variable (-0.17, p value of 0.0896) which reduces the potential for a significant bias.  None of the 
police districts cover significantly different neighborhoods in terms of socio-economic 
characteristics. In other words, many of the violent crime neighborhoods have a police district of 
their own and most of the overlap occurred among the subject suburbs. Third, the distance 
variable may be an imperfect measurement of travel costs because fares do not necessarily 
increase proportionally with distance. Travel time, however, does increase with distance as well 
as other obstacles like familiarity with the area. For that reason, the distance measure is a close 
                                                 
8
 MacDonald (2002) finds that an average of 39 percent of crimes in Europe, the UK and the United States are 
reported and justifies further crime studies based on the consistency of this proportion.  
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approximate for the burden of committing a crime in a distant suburb.  A final concern is that of 
ecological fallacy, or the situation whereby concentrations of crime within a suburb are not 
revealed in the aggregated crime data but whose location can be explained by local factors. By 
using the smallest unit available and controlling for land use, I hope to limit this effect while still 
recognizing that the exact location of crime is unknown.   
V. Results 
 An OLS estimating method is used to predict the relative magnitudes of the effects of 
distance and income on crime while controlling for local confounding variables. Table 6 reports 
the results. The distance coefficient is significant but the sign contradicts theory. A positive 
coefficient suggests that the subject suburbs experience 13.05 more crimes per thousand people 
for every additional kilometer between them and the nearest violent crime neighborhood. In 
other words, suburbs that are further from neighborhoods with high rates of violent crime have a 
greater occurrence of crime per person than suburbs that are closest to violent crime 
neighborhoods. Such a result is surprising given the higher cost of traveling to far away suburbs.   
This positive relationship might exist because households in suburbs near low income 
neighborhoods have invested in tighter security measures (taller fences and gates, dogs, alarm 
systems) to protect themselves from the perceived heightened risk of their neighbors. Likewise, 
perhaps residents of and visitors to more remote suburbs feel safer and are less likely to be on 
guard which makes them attractive targets. Another possibility is that criminals chose to travel 
further to commit their crime so that their escape destination is further away where they can hide 
more easily and decrease the chance of being caught. Finally, it may be that distance is an 
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incomplete measure of costs, as public transportation allows cheap travel across longer distances 
so that the relationship between distance and cost of travel is not a proportionally linear.   
 The positive sign on the income variable is consistent with what theory predicts, though 
this result falls just short of being statistically significant. Rational criminals seek the highest 
return and expect to maximize that return in wealthier neighborhoods where property is more 
valuable. The result suggests that as the percentage of households in the top two categories 
increases by one, 1.75 more crimes per thousand people occur.   
 Another interesting result is the negative and significant coefficient on distance to city 
center. As predicted, suburbs that are nearest to the city center experience higher crime rates-
crime falls by 4.94 crimes per thousand people for every additional kilometer between the suburb 
and the city center. This suggests that criminals might also be making their decision of where to 
commit a crime using the city center as a starting point. Given its function as the center of 
economic activity, the city center also hosts the biggest public transportation hub with all train 
routes and many taxi routes leading straight to the city. It is also possible that given its position 
at the base of the mountain that divides the beach areas from the main metropolitan area, it 
serves as a transfer site for criminals targeting the beach areas and better explains crime rates 
than the distance to the nearest violent crime neighborhood.  
 The other coefficient that reports a significant and expected result is percent of business 
land use which predicts an increase in crime rates when a greater percentage of land is used for 
business purposes. This result supports both social disorganization theory and routine activity 
theory. In other words, for reasons of neighborhood cohesiveness, anonymity, and increased 
pedestrian and vehicle traffic, criminals target areas with greater business activity. The 
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coefficient on percentage of residential land use is positive but insignificant. The variable for 
home ownership shows an insignificant effect on crime rates. While surprising, it may be 
explained by Cape Town’s history of apartheid and land reform so that ownership status does not 
accurately reflect neighborhood stability.  
 Given the amount of discretion in categorizing the suburbs into two groups, I test the 
robustness of the results to with two alternative specifications. Following from the social 
disorganization theory, I chose two other variables that might characterize the delinquent areas of 
Cape Town. First, income is used as a proxy for poverty, unemployment, and limited education 
opportunities in neighborhoods that therefore are, according to theory, conducive to criminal 
activity.   Second, race is a particularly appropriate variable in Cape Town because while middle 
income suburbs have experienced some racial integration since the end of apartheid, the 
townships and colored neighborhoods remain segregated pockets of those two ethnic groups.  I 
apply a method similar to that used for determining high violent crime neighborhoods, but for 
income and race. For the income category specification, I determine the 25th percentile for the 
entire sample for the percentage of households in the bottom income category (less than 
R19,201, $2,258 US$2001). For the race specification, I find the 25th percentile of the percent 
white population. Figures 12 and 13 show how the suburbs of Cape Town are divided under the 
two other specifications. Comparing Figures 5-7 shows a cluster of neighborhoods that all fall in 
the category from which criminals are assumed to reside, with only a few neighborhoods that 
change position relative to others between the different specifications. As with the original 
specification, I estimate a linear regression model for each of the two and report the results side 
by side with the original results in Table 7. The results of the two additional specifications lend 
strong support to the patterns suggested by the original specification. With the exception of 
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minor changes in the magnitude of each coefficient, the direction and significance of each 
variable does not change across specifications. 
VI. Conclusion 
 I use a cost-benefit model to predict the spatial patterns of crime in Cape Town suburbs 
with respect to nearby violent crime neighborhoods. By measuring benefit by income and cost as 
the distance to the closest violent crime neighborhood, I predict that more crime would happen in 
neighborhoods close to the criminal’s base that have the greatest income.  
 The results of an OLS estimation model that controls for other neighborhood level 
contributors to crime suggest an interesting relationship. If distance to a middle or high income 
neighborhood is a good measurement of the direct costs of committing a crime, it appears that 
criminals from violent crime neighborhoods travel further to commit property crimes.  In 
addition to contradicting theory, this result is particularly interesting because of the accused 
“white fear” of townships and violent crime neighborhoods. The common complaints that middle 
and upper income neighborhoods near violent crime neighborhoods experience greater property 
crime are not supported by the empirical analysis and suggest ulterior agendas of the complaints.  
 This result is also relevant for Cape Town policy makers and police forces who must 
protect a strong tax base in the interest of developing the urban area. It is possible that the 
relatively lower crime rates in the suburbs near violent crime neighborhoods are a direct outcome 
of concentrated police and security efforts. If that is the case, the results of this study suggest 
those measures are effective and should now be applied to those suburbs further away. Policy 
makers can also look at features of the more distant neighborhoods to try to understand whether 
there are certain characteristics of those neighborhoods that make the extra travel worthwhile for 
criminals. Given their proximity to the ocean, the distant suburbs are an attraction for tourists 
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who are unfamiliar with appropriate security measures. Additionally, policy makers can 
incorporate the strong relationship between business land use and crime into their strategy and 
direct resources to these areas.    
 While these results provide surprising and important insights, the study raises many 
questions that can be addressed in future research. The question of scale is an important one for 
any future research into spatial patterns of crime. Rather than using a unit as large as an entire 
suburb, gathering information on the proximity of certain locations that are common targets of 
criminals would be more valuable. For example, if local shopping centers attract crime, a 
measurement of the closest shopping centers to black and colored neighborhoods would reveal 
more about the traveling patterns of criminals. From a methodological perspective, the income 
and distance variables should be redefined and retested for robustness. Other explanatory 
variables, such as other land uses, education, and demographics for each suburb need to be 
included in regression analysis. As suggested earlier, tourism hot spots could be isolated and 
tested against other suburbs to see if their presence explains crime rates. Future work should also 
consider train and taxi routes to measure the accessibility of each suburb.  
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